Transformation of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy after 2014 Regarding Ukraine Crisis

Ukrayna Krizi Bağlamında 2014 Yılı Sonrası AB Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikasının Dönüşümü

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Abstract

This research aims at analysing the nature and transformation of the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy since 2014. Having been founded in the post-Cold War peace environment, the Common Security and Defence Policy had an expeditionary characteristic compatible with the European Union's soft/normative power. However, this peaceful security environment changed after the Ukraine Crisis in 2014. With new security parameters, the transformation of the Common Security and Defence Policy needs to be analysed in an academic context. In this regard, the research question of the article has been conceptualized as "To what extend has post-Ukraine Crisis security perception affected Common Security and Defence Policy transformation?". There are two main findings of this research. First, the characteristics of the Common Security and Defence Policy have evolved from being expeditionary to territorial/collective defence in nature. Second, the fragmentation in the European Union is deepening in terms of defence and security policies. This research concludes that the European Union cannot develop an effective and integrated policy and instead will choose to conform to the United States' NATO policies in order to deter the Russian Federation.

Keywords: *Common Security and Defence Policy, NATO, European Union, Defence and Security, Ukraine Crisis.*

Öz

Bu araştırma, 2014 yılından bu yana Avrupa Birliği Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikasının doğasını ve dönüşümünü analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Soğuk Savaş sonrası barış ortamında kurulmuş olan bu politika, Avrupa Birliği'nin yumuşak ve

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normatif gücüyle uyumlu olarak, Avrupa dışı girişimlerini öne çıkaran bir niteliğe sahipti. Ancak, bu barış ve güvenlik ortamı 2014 Ukrayna Krizi'nden sonra değişmiştir. Yeni güvenlik parametreleri ve bölgesel gelişmeler doğrultusunda, bu politikanın akademik bir kapsamda analiz edilmesi ihtiyacı ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu bağlamda makalenin araştırma sorusu, "Ukrayna Krizi sonrası güvenlik algısı Avrupa Birliği Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikasının dönüşümünü ne ölçüde etkilemiştir?" şeklinde kavramsallaştırılmıştır. Bu makalenin ana bulguları iki yönlüdür. Birincisi, Avrupa Birliği'nin Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası, Avrupa dışı boyuttan bölgesel/toplu savunma özelliklerine doğru evrilmektedir. İkincisi, savunma ve güvenlik politikaları açısından Avrupa Birliği'ndeki ayrışma derinleşmektedir. Çalışmada, Avrupa Birliği'nin Rusya Federasyonu'nu caydırmak maksadıyla, etkin ve bütünleşik bir politika geliştiremeyeceği ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin NATO politikaları ile uyumlu hareket edeceği sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası, NATO, Avrupa Birliği, Savunma ve Güvenlik, Ukrayna Krizi.*

Introduction

After World War II, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact were the adversaries of the West, and the United States (US), through NATO, was the unique security provider for Europe. NATO's conventional (territorial) defence was robust and credible, even though it ultimately relied on nuclear weapons.[1] The security and defence dimension of Western Europe became the responsibility of NATO, and the alliance relied on a substantial US conventional and nuclear commitment to Europe. Under NATO's security umbrella, the European Union (EU) focused on welfare development and the rule of law. With the end of the Cold War, the EU, due to its limited military capability, used the projection of soft power to control its area of interest, by advocating its values, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. On the other hand, the attention of the US and NATO, shifted from Europe with the adoption of a more global perspective. The declining role of NATO as a committed security provider for Europe caused the emergence of initiatives resulting in the Europeanization of European national security policies.[2] It was under these conditions that the Common

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[1] Rebecca R. Moore and Damon Coletta, *NATO's Return to Europe: Engaging Ukraine Russia, and Beyond*, Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC, 2017, p. 99.
[2] Petros Violakis, *Europeanisation and the Transformation of EU Security Policy: Post-Cold*

Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was born. In 1991, in order to establish political unity, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) was agreed, which also introduced the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its integral part, the CSDP.

In the meantime, the peaceful security environment, enabled the EU to accelerate its efforts for enlargement and engagement with the post-Soviet states in its neighbourhood. This was a real threat to the Russian Federation (RF) that desired to regain its previous power. Eventually, it was the Ukraine Crisis, which is still likely to turn into a war today, that became a turning point, a reminder of the reality of the balance of power in international relations, and it was unquestionably the most significant crisis for European security since the end of the Cold War. This phenomenon, together with related post-crisis developments in Europe, has changed not only the threat perceptions of most of the European States, and European defence posture, but also relations between NATO, the EU and the US. These changes have also had an impact on the key characteristics of the EU's CSDP, causing its transformation from post-Cold War conditions to post-Ukraine Crisis conditions.

As stated in various official documents, the purpose of NATO and the presence of the US in Europe is to defend the allies against aggression, primarily in the role of territorial defence within the borders of the Alliance. In contrast, the CSDP is a tool to be used exclusively outside the EU's borders. Thus, while analysing the research topic, indicators have been used to demonstrate the transformation of the CSDP. These indicators are the rise of importance of collective/territorial defence versus expeditionary operations in Europe; the increase in military expenditures; and the differences in threat and security perceptions among the member states after the Ukraine crisis.

This article has been prepared in order to explain a multi-dimensional phenomenon which has had a significant impact on European security: CSDP transformation. Following the critical developments in Europe after

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War Developments in the Common Security and Defence Policy, Routledge Studies in European Security and Strategy, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon, 2018, p. 35.

2014, it became critical to study this phenomenon from all perspectives. However, the Ukraine Crisis and related post-crisis developments, the interaction between the key protagonists, and the impact of this interaction on the CSDP, have rarely been studied from an academic perspective. In this context, this article aims to make a significant and substantial contribution to the literature, as it addresses a demonstrable gap in the field. The purpose of this study is to make further research into the transformation of CSDP in the light of related significant developments in Europe after 2014. In this regard, the research question of the paper has been conceptualized as "To what extend has post-Ukraine Crisis security perception affected CSDP transformation?". The research is set in an empirical framework as the research question is answered through searching the current literature and existing policy documents concerning the CSDP.

The research uses a qualitative research methodology to analyse and interpret the data and to reach its conclusion. It utilizes a hermeneutic research technique within a descriptive and conceptual framework to investigate the current written and visual literature and existing policy documents concerning the CSDP. Thus, the research for this study has been based on secondary data collection methods i.e. document analysis, content analysis and discourse analysis techniques. In order to analyse the research topic in a comprehensive way, various documents about the EU, NATO and the US have been utilized for the main data collection of the literature survey.

In this research, the neorealist approach has been applied as a theoretical framework since it emphasizes the role of the state, national interest and military power in world politics. A smooth and linear study plan has been followed in the research. In the introduction to this article, the theoretical framework for analysing the research topic has been described, and the research question, purpose, importance of the study, and research design have been explained. In the first main part, brief information about the key characteristics of CSDP and its transformation is given. This part provides insight into features of the main phenomenon studied in the article. In the second main part, the major security implications after 2014 are analysed. The Ukraine Crisis and related significant developments that have had a direct effect on CSDP transformation have been thoroughly investigated. In the last part of the study, the main findings are shared with the reader. With the influence of NATO and US policies, CSDP started to

show more collective defence features, and member states tended to increase their defence spending, especially on territorial defence assets. Furthermore, fragmentation among EU member states may cause problems in determining the future direction of the CSDP. The findings obtained throughout the study have been analysed and interpreted to conclude that a likely outcome is that the EU, despite its desire for being a global actor, would choose to conform to the US' NATO policies in order to deter the RF.

1. The EU CSDP: From Characteristics to Transformation

The development of the EU's CSDP was a product of the end of the Cold War. Establishing a European security and defence structure had always been a desire (especially for France) since the late 1940s to maintain the autonomous European security and defence capability.[3] Yet, it was not realized until the end of the Cold War. The Petersburg Declaration[4] of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1992 was the first sign of the features of the contemporary CSDP.[5] Having realized Europe's lack of capacity to act even in its own backyard, in the Balkans, the UK and France launched the Saint-Malo Declaration in December 1998.[6] This summit became another significant milestone for the CSDP, which reflected an agreement of the British and French positions, with a shared consensus that an autonomous European military capability would not replace or rival NATO, yet could be developed alongside and in co-operation with existing alliance commitments.[7] The Cologne Summit started the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).[8] At the Helsinki European Council in 1999, EU

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[3] Adrian Hyde-Price, "The Common Security and Defence Policy", Hugo Meijer and Marco Wyss (ed.), *The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018, p. 393.

[4] Apart from contributing to the common, military units of the WEU member states could be employed for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peace-making.

[5] Asle Toje, *The European Union as a Small Power: After the Post-Cold War*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, NY, 2010, p. 96.

[6] Johanna Möhring, "The Three Elephants of European Security", Texas National Security Review, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/the-three-elephants-of-european-security (Retrieved: 25.11.2020)

[7] Adrian Hyde-Price, Ibid, p. 398.

[8] Şeyda Hanbay, "Involvement of Non-EU European NATO Members in Common Security and Defense Policy: The Turkish Case", *Ankara University European Research*

member states set themselves the headline goal of being able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one-year forces up to Corps level.[9] Its aim was to give the EU an *'autonomous capacity to take decisions where NATO as a whole is not engaged'*, in order to conduct EU-led military operations. And finally, with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, CSDP was transformed into its current status. In this regard, the importance of CSDP is emphasized as follows: *"CSDP enables the Union to take a leading role in peace-keeping operations, conflict prevention and in the strengthening of the international security. It is an integral part of the EU's comprehensive approach towards crisis management, drawing on civilian and military assets."*[10]

In the transformation process, the CSDP became a critical means of the EU's soft power. Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP from 1999 to 2009, concurred that the CSDP was seen to be the 'teeth' of the CFSP. The CSDP embodied somehow the independence of the EU against the US and pushed forward the EU to become the global player. However, the main characteristic of the CSDP as defined in the TEU is that it focuses on global problems rather than defending Europe. The TEU also added some extra missions that are slightly different from the Petersburg tasks with article 43(1).[11] The mission types of the EU in the CSDP framework are mainly of expeditionary characteristic. Because the defence of Europe is left to NATO, the CSDP had no interest in collective or European territorial defence. Many security perceptions after 2014 recalled the importance of collective/territorial defence and deterrence again. Consequently, NATO and the US have refocussed on territorial defence in Europe, ipso facto, making impacts on the transformation of CSDP.

Center, 2013, No. 37, p. 50.

[9] Burkard Schmitt, "European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP)", p. 1, https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/06-bsecap.pdf (Retrieved: 20.11.2020)

[10] https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/431/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp_en (Retrieved: 25.11.2020)

[11] Article 43 (1): *"The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation."*

The CSDP missions that have occurred so far confirm these characteristics of CSDP. The other features of the CSDP's missions could be summarized as follow:

    a. The geographical area in which the mission is conducted should be in the area of interest of one of the largest members in the EU. In this sense, it is easy to understand why many of the missions are in Africa and conducted by France. However, to launch any CSDP mission, whether military or civilian in nature, requires unanimous agreement of EU member states.

    b. The missions are civilian in character or just civilian-led, due to limited military capability of the EU.

    c. Contributions by other actors' are essential to manage the missions properly. While the UN provides the legal framework of the mission, the US generally supports the missions with high-end military capabilities.

Literature generally agrees about why and how the CSDP has been transformed; however, the analyses can be divided into two groups. Some scholars tend to look from a constructivist and liberal institutionalist perspective since these are compatible with the EU's normative power.[12] However, most scholars tend to look through the realist perspective in assessing the CSDP. This latter group emphasizes the role of CSDP as balancing or bandwagoning to the other players. Hyde-Price[13] considers the CSDP as a response to American hegemony since the unipolarity and freedom of action has made its commitment to European states less predictable and less reliable in the post-Cold War era. From the neorealist perspective, CSDP is used by the EU to balance against the US.[14] Hence, the EU is using CSDP to ensure the EU is less reliant on the US and to build up the EU's own military power.[15] However, Howorth and Menon suggest[16]

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[12] Christoph O. Meyer, "The Purpose and Pitfalls of Constructivist Forecasting: Insights from Strategic Culture Research for the European Union's Evolution as a Military Power", *International Studies Quarterly*, 2011, Vol. 55, Issue 3, p. 683.

[13] Adrian Hyde-Price, Ibid, p. 390-392.

[14] Seth G. Jones, *The Rise of European Security Cooperation*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 57.

[15] Barry R. Posen, "European Union Security and Defence Policy: Response to

that this view misunderstands the rationale behind CSDP to answer the USA's burden-sharing calls and the actualities of the policy, in which the EU has deployed a far greater number of civilian missions than military ones. Also, Demetriou[17] posits that the EU cannot afford to 'go solo' and its close co-operation with the CSDP can only be beneficial for US–EU relations and will undoubtedly result in a more effective and enduring NATO.

In addition, Lindstrom and Tardy[18] suggests that NATO and the EU are essential partners, and their co-operation is crucial to counter and respond to contemporary security threats. Kaynar and Ak[19] favour the co-operation of European and North American nations in order that NATO should have the capabilities and structures to act against security threats. Some scholars are of the opinion that the EU should become a global actor because of its strategic position, economic power and power balance.[20] Accordingly, the EU should be an independent security provider and have the capability to defend itself. In this sense, the CSDP must equip the EU with the ability to take autonomous and substantial actions, especially when NATO is unwilling or not ready to act.[21] While some think that the EU's CSDP should be much more militarily capable of protecting itself, others, like Kaldor[22], think that CSDP should focus on global security. From a different perspective, EU-NATO/US collaboration is seen as the reflection

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Unipolarity?", *Security Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2006, p. 159.

[16] Joylon Howorth and Anand Menon, "Still not Pushing Back: Why the European Union is not Balancing the United States", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 53, No. 5, 2009, p. 741.

[17] Petros Demetriou, "NATO & CSDP: Can the EU Afford to Go Solo?", *Cogent Social Science*, Vol. 2, Issue: 1, 2016, DOI: 10.1080/23311886.2016.1208376.

[18] Gustav Lindstrom and Thierry Tardy, "The EU and NATO: The Essential Partners", *European Union Institute for Security Studies*, 2019, p. 5.

[19] Mete K. Kaynar and Gökhan Ak, "The EU/CFSP and NATO: Possibility of a Co-Existence as Brothers-in-arms?", *International Journal of Research-Granthaalayah*, 2017, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 118.

[20] Uğur Özgöker and Zekeriya A. Bedirhan, "The European Common Foreign and Security Policy and Turkey's Contribution", *Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy*, 2017, No. 1, Vol. 5, p. 81.

[21] Katerina Veljanovska, "The Changing Nature of Security in Europe: The Triangle between Russia's New Foreign Policy", the CSDP and NATO", *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, Vol. 15, No. 3, September 2015, p. 62.

[22] Mary Kaldor, "The EU as a New Form of Political Authority: The Example of the Common Security and Defence Policy", *The Journal Global Policy*, 2012, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 85.

of Atlanticist policies led by the US, and it is assessed that linking the linking new defence and security policy with that of NATO results in the effective "militarization" of the EU.[23] The CSDP, being the vanguard of the EU's international presence, enables the EU to become a global actor by delivering its values, supporting the official discourse; and as the key feature of EU foreign policy, it symbolizes the ambition to develop a political union.[24] Most of these analyses are in agreement that the CSDP was an outcome of a specific set of conditions in the post-Cold War era, which, nevertheless, reflected a recurrent aspiration for an autonomous European security and defence capability.[25]

According to Drent,[26] the EU must play a role 'in defence of Europe', both in response to hybrid threats from the East as well as to the spillover effects of the conflicts to the South. Missiroli[27] assesses that CSDP is a member-state-led process lacking political support from most EU member states. According to McCauley,[28] the impact of NATO and the US on the armament of the EU is indisputable, and Kempin and Mawdsley[29] postulate that the CSDP is a useful tool in which the US could export its strategic doctrine to EU member states. Biscop[30] claims that the US still shares many interests with the EU, while it also has its own geopolitical concerns that are quite different from Europe. Jones[31] states that the US seemed willing to facilitate the creation of an EU defence; however, it did not

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[23] Richard Sakwa, "'New Cold War' or Twenty Years' Crisis? Russia and International Politics", *International Affairs*, March 2008, Volume 84, Issue 2, p. 242.
[24] Roy H. Ginsberg and Susan E. Penksa, *The European Union in Global Security: the Politics of Impact*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 17.
[25] Adrian Hyde-Price, Ibid, p. 394-396.
[26] Margriet Drent and Dick Zandee, "European Defence: From Strategy to Delivery", *Global Affairs*, Vol. 2, Issue 1, p. 69.
[27] Antonio Missiroli, "The EU and the World: Players and Policies Post-Lisbon", *EU Institute for Security Studies*, Paris, 2016, p. 51.
[28] Martin McCauley, Origins of the Cold War 1941-1949, 3rd Edition, Pearson Longman, Harlow, 2008, p. 27.
[29] Ronja Kempin and Jocelyn Mawdsley, "The Common Security and Defence Policy as an Act of American Hegemony", *European Security*, 2013, Vol. 22, Issue 1, p. 55.
[30] Sven Biscop, *European Strategy in the 21st Century: New Future for Old Power*, *Routledge*, Taylor & Francis Group, London, New York, 2019, p. 11.
[31] Seth G. Jones, *The Rise of European Security Cooperation*, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 71.

want to see it as an independent actor from NATO. In sum, many authors concur that the EU continues to be a fragmented, inconsistent, and ineffective player in military crisis management and lacks great strategy.

As seen, the literature generally focuses on the CSDP itself or its relations with the US and NATO. However, there is a deficiency in explaining that its transformation since 2014 has been influenced by the shift in balance of power between global players. In this regard, the most suitable theoretical approach for studying the CSDP is neorealism. The neorealist literature regards the integration process of the EU in defence and security policies as the reflection of the neorealist strategies of balancing, bandwagoning, and buck-passing.[32] The evolution of CSDP was an EU strategy to balance the US in the evolving unipolar post-Cold War international environment. Since the EU represents soft power, this differs from traditional balancing, and it does not automatically lead to distancing Europe from the US.[33] The EU uses the CSDP to ensure it is less reliant on the US and to build up its own military power.[34]

Developments after 2014 have not resolved the security concerns of the EU. Thus, the intense collaboration between the EU and NATO and their activities after 2014 can be seen an example to reduce and balance the power of the RF in eastern and central Europe. On the other hand, from the RF perspective, Ukraine represents the battlefield to balance the power of the EU and the US. With the beginning of the 2000s (after Vladimir Putin came into power), the RF started to change its policy and considered that, with the aggressive expansion process of NATO and the EU, the US and Europe were gaining more while the RF was losing its potential instruments of power. In 2016, With the EU-NATO Declaration, the EU seemed to select bandwagoning to NATO and the US as a means to balance against RF power. After the Ukraine Crisis, through their policies, NATO and the US have exploited the EU's economic power by converting it

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[32] Maxime H.A. Larivé, *Debating European Security and Defense Policy: Understanding the Complexity*, Global Interdisciplinary Studies Series, Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, Ashgate, 2014, p. 12.

[33] Lorenzo Cladi and Andrea Locatelli, "Bandwagoning, not Balancing: Why Europe Confounds Realism", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 2012, Vol. 33, Issue 2, p. 265.

[34] Barry R. Posen, Ibid, p. 164.

into military power, which is the main argument of this article. Under these considerations, the Ukraine Crisis is regarded as a critical turning point for balance of power between the EU, the RF, the US and NATO.

2. Major Security Implications since 2014 and Their Impacts on CSDP Transformation

With regards to CSDP transformation, there have been some critical events in recent history. In order to frame the research, the starting point for these critical events has been determined as the Ukraine Crisis. The literature related to security studies mostly concurs that the Ukraine Crisis in 2014 was the turning point for the relationships between the West and the RF, and it was the end of the post-Cold War system. In addition to the Ukraine Crisis, although not as critical and conclusive, some other significant developments, which have had serious and major security implications for the transformation of the CSDP, were also studied in this research. In the following parts, related critical and significant events are clarified and their effect on CSDP transformation are explained.

2.1. Ukraine Crisis

The Ukraine Crisis, which started in 2014 and still continues to turn the West-Russian relations into turmoil, was the RF's response to the West to maintain the balance of power. NATO enlargement, together with EU enlargement, was considered a threat by the RF, the latter a threat against the RF economy, and the former a threat against its security. Furthermore, the RF considered any steps towards economic integration with the EU as a threat to its broader geopolitical aspirations.[35] After the collapse of the Soviet Union, some former member states (Baltic States) decided to join the EU. The problem stemmed from other countries' hesitation between joining the EU and accepting the integration proposed by the RF. Consequently, competition between the RF and the EU became inevitable.[36]

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[35] Nicu Popescu, "First Lessons from the Ukrainian Crisis, European Union Institute for Security Studies", 2014, p. 1 https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/first-lessons-ukrainian-crisis (Retrieved: 01.12.2020)

[36] Pablo P. Rivera and Anna Garaschcuk, "The Eurasian Economic Union: Prospective Regional Integration in the post-Soviet Space or just Geopolitical Project?," *Eastern Journal of European Studies*, Centre for European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, 2016, Vol. 7, Issue 2, p. 92.

The RF's primary objective has been to restore itself as a significant global power in the international system. Its efforts are aimed at reversing US influence in Europe.[37] Eventually, these two powers clashed in Ukraine.

During the Cold War, European defence and security architecture was established against the Warsaw Pact and was collective/territorial-defence centric. During post-Cold War period, co-operation prevailed in EU and RF relations, but owing to EU and NATO enlargement policies, this turned into competition between 2004 and 2014. Finally, the Ukraine Crisis transformed relations into confrontation in 2014.[38] Especially during the competition phase, NATO and the EU considered that security could be provided by liberal democracy. As a result, the EU and US policies on post-Soviet territory led to a number of regime changes through the "colour revolutions" and this was perceived as a threat by the RF. [39] Finally, the RF's behaviour towards the EU became more aggressive as the Kremlin saw the ongoing integration of eastern European countries into NATO as a threat to its authority.[40] Prepared within the post-Cold War security environment, the European Security and Strategy (ESS) lays out the EU's security concerns, all of which point outside the EU and predominantly outside Europe.[41] Also, with the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Eastern Partnership (EaP), the EU increased its focus outside its borders and area of interest.

The new security environment that came into existence with the RF's "aggressive strategy" changed the threat perception of European countries. According to Walt,[42] the RF, after the Ukraine Crisis, became a threat to Europe, and not only to the US. The RF's aggression poses a challenge to the

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[37] Marcel H. van Herpen, *Putin's Wars: The Rise of Russia's New Imperialism*, Second edition, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2015, p. 239-241.
[38] Tom Casier and Joan DeBardeleben, *EU-Russia Relations in Crisis: Understanding Diverging Perceptions*, Routledge Studies in European Foreign Policy, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon, 2018, p. 4.
[39] Richard Sakwa, Ibid, p. 241-243.
[40] Ibid.
[41] David J. Galbreath, Laura Chappell and Jocelyn Mawdsley, *Contemporary European Security*, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon, 2019, p. 90.
[42] Stephen M. Walt, "NATO Owes Putin a Big Thank-You", 2014, https://foreign policy.com/2014/09/04/nato-owes-putin-a-big-thank-you/ (Retrieved: 02.12.2020)

EU's aspirations to be a global actor. Its impact can easily be seen in the 2016 European Global Security (EUGS). The EUGS argues that:

"As Europeans, (…) we must be ready and able to deter, respond to, and protect ourselves against external threats. While NATO exists to defend its members (…), Europeans must be better equipped, trained and organized to contribute decisively to such collective efforts. (…) An appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe's ability to foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond its borders."

Geographically, the EUGS focuses, unsurprisingly, on the European continent. It also represents an elaboration of the themes found in the ESS, along with subtle changes and the inclusion of new threats that have emerged since 2003.[43] On the other hand, the Ukraine Crisis accelerated the EU's own defence efforts. As stated previously, the Lisbon Treaty represents a significant milestone in the institutionalization of EU defence policy. It introduced Permanent Structural Cooperation (PESCO),[44] through which member states increase their effectiveness in addressing security challenges and advance towards further integration and strengthening of defence co-operation within the EU framework. Although it had not been activated by 2017, "Putin, Brexit, and Trump" led to its revival.[45] This new security environment inevitably affected NATO as well, which was forced to return to the hard business of defending European territory.[46] In its retransformation, NATO is willing to go with the EU's CSDP, hand in hand. In addition, it is also crucial to assess the impact of the US on the CSDP. It is worth underlining that, as the most significant contributor to NATO, the US and

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[43] Spyros Economides and James Sperling, *EU Security Strategies: Extending the EU System of Security Governance*, Routledge Studies in European Security and Strategy. Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon, 2018, p. 11.

[44] Jolyon Howorth, "Strategic Autonomy: Why It's Not About Europe Going it Alone", 2019, https://www.martenscentre.eu/publication/strategic-autonomy-why-its-not-about-europe-going-it-alone (Retrieved: 02.12.2020)

[45] Sven Biscop, "Differentiated Integration in Defence: A Plea for PESCO", 2017, https://www.iai.it/it/pubblicazioni/differentiated-integration-defence-plea-pesco (Retrieved: 02.12.2020)

[46] Alexander Mattealer, "Rediscovering Geography in NATO Defence Planning", *Journal Defence Studies*, 2018, Vol. 18, Issue 3, p. 351.

its policies have been behind NATO's activities after the Ukraine Crisis,[47] as has always been the case since the foundation of NATO.

2.2. NATO's Transformation and Improvement of Readiness

During the Cold War NATO's focus was collective/territorial defence[48] of the Alliance, and each member state was responsible for defending its territory until NATO members could arrive.[49] However, with the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the main threat towards Europe, the security environment had transformed, and NATO's "raison d'être" started to be questioned.[50] Although collective defence was on its agenda during the post-Cold War period, NATO's new role transformed to being a global security provider by focusing on crisis response operations on the global scale.[51] NATO no longer focussed on territorial defence, but considered its purpose as bringing countries together with similar values to fight against global problems.[52]

This environment of peace in Europe was reflected even in NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept. It posits that "*The Euro-Atlantic Area is at peace, and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low*". This period also coincides with the EU's aspirations as a global actor. However, it did not last long, and the Ukraine Crisis in 2014 brought NATO back to its core

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[47] Luis Simon, America's Asian "Rebalancing" and the Future of Europe, in BISCOP, Sven & FIOTT, Daniel (eds), *The State of Defence in Europe: State of Emergency?*, Egmont Paper 62, November 2013, p. 27.

[48] The difference between territorial defence and expeditionary operations: first one is main characteristic of NATO, while the latter of the CSDP. Collective defence means that an attack against one ally is considered as an attack against all (Yost, D. S., 2010: 489-522). While territorial defence mostly required armoured units, artillery and short-range air superiority fighters, expeditionary operations and forces need rapid reaction forces with flexible structure and light weapons, deployable over great distances, equipped with modern communication assets (Gärtner H.-2003:135-147). The heading 'expeditionary power' refers to countries with a proven ability to deploy limited capabilities at strategic range.

[49] Rebecca R. Moore and Damon Coletta, Ibid.

[50] Jennifer Medcalf, *NATO: A Beginner's Guide*, Oneworld Publications, Oxford, England, 2005, p. 22.

[51] John R. Deni, *NATO and Article 5: The Transatlantic Alliance and the Twenty-First-Century Challenges of Collective Defense*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2017, p. 13-15.

[52] Ivo Daalder and Jim Goldgeier, "Global NATO", Foreign Affairs, 2006, Vol. 85, Issue 5, p. 111.

business: territorial defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The Wales Summit in September 2014 points out the turning point:

"RF's aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. Growing instability in our southern neighbourhood (…) is also challenging our security. These can all have long-term consequences for peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region and stability across the globe." [53]

Following the dramatic deterioration of the European security environment in 2014, NATO was forced to return to the hard business of defending European territory.[54] Collective defence and deterrence has become a priority for NATO in Europe against a peer state competitor, namely the RF. NATO's Wales Summit was dominated by NATO's reaction to the Ukraine Crisis and the reaffirmation of collective defence.[55] Daniel confirmed the changes in the focus of the European Security:

"Deployability, mobility and more lightly armed forces were the focus at the end of the 1990s. Today, heavy weaponry, firepower and armoured vehicles have regained their prominence. (…) Territorial defence is back on the agenda and for many countries has become the main priority, in light of the threats posed by RF and its provocative military actions." [56]

Moreover, after the Wales Summit, some measures were taken by NATO to balance and deter the RF,[57] such as reassurance of central-eastern allies and deterrence of the RF, enhanced forward presence, increasing defence investment, NATO Readiness Initiative (NRI); these measures were also signs of returning to a focus on collective defence. Since 22 countries in Europe are members of both NATO and the EU, it has been inevitable that NATO policies deeply affect EU member states and accordingly the

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[53] NATO Wales Summit Declaration, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales from 4 to 5 September, para. 1, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/sede/dv/sede 240914walessummit_/sede240914walessummit_en.pdf (Retrieved: 02.12.2020)
[54] Alexander Mattealer, Ibid.
[55] Rebecca R. Moore and Damon Coletta, Ibid, p. 99.
[56] Fiott Daniel, "The CSDP in 2020-The EU's Legacy and Ambition in Security and Defence", *European Union Institute for Security Studies* (EUISS), 2020, p. 50-53.
[57] David J. Galbreath, Laura Chappell and Jocelyn Mawdsley, Ibid, p. 55-57.

CSDP. In this regard, the implicit division of labour between the EU and NATO is likely to disappear. NATO concerns itself with territorial defence and a focus on the 'East', while the EU broadens as a security provider for unstable regions such as Africa.[58]

The Ukraine Crisis provoked NATO to realize that it didn't have a proper force to respond to the emerging threats and to deter the RF. NATO has significantly improved its readiness since 2014. Forces, plans and command structures are being updated and interoperability and mobility are continuously enhanced. Starting with Wales Summit, the effort to increase the readiness level continued with NRI. This initiative is a novel innovation for NATO member states. Allies have committed, by 2020, to having 30 battalions; 30 air squadrons; and 30 naval combat vessels ready to use within 30 days.[59] Except for Iceland, which does not have armed forces, all NATO members are going to contribute to this initiative.[60]

2.3. Increase in Defence Investment

Besides the increase in hard-power, more defence spending would appear to be highly beneficial, especially in terms of equitable burden-sharing, deterring adversaries and managing threats, and reassuring other allies.[61] In order to increase its level of deterrence, at the Wales Summit, NATO reached the decision to increase defence expenditure.[62] Indeed, six years later from the Wales Summit, defence budgets and spending of EU

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[58] Clingendael (Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael) Report, "2015 New Threats, New EU and NATO Responses", https://www.clingendael.org/publication/new-threats-new-eu-and-nato-responses (Retrieved: 02.12.2020)

[59] NATO Readiness Initiative, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_06/20180608_1806-NATO-Readiness-Initiative_en.pdf, (Retrieved: 02.12.2020)

[60] Nicholas Fiorenza, "NATO Improves Force Readiness", https://www.janes.com/article/93011/nato-improves-force-readiness (Retrieved: 02.12.2020)

[61] John R. Deni, Ibid, p. 13-16.

[62] At the Wales Summit, NATO leaders endorsed a Defence Investment Pledge. The pledge called for all Allies that did not already meet the NATO-agreed guideline of spending 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence to stop cuts to defence budgets, gradually increase spending, and aim to move towards spending 2% of GDP on defence within a decade. Allies also agreed, in that same time-frame, to move towards spending at least 20% of annual defence expenditure on major new equipment, including related research and development.

countries[63] are gradually increasing, even if not yet at the level desired by NATO. According to SIPRI Fact Sheet: "*Arms imports by states in Europe fell by 37 per cent between 2005–2009 and 2010–14. However, this downward trend reversed in 2015–19: arms imports by European states were 3.2 per cent higher than in 2010–14 and accounted for 11 per cent of the global total.*"[64] In order to understand the impact of increasing defence spending in terms of collective defence, together with interaction with CSDP transformation, the defence planning efforts of NATO need to be examined, and this will be explained in following part.

2.4. NATO Defence Planning Process and its Interaction with the EU Military Capabilities

One of the results of the co-operation between NATO and EU is the close coordination in their defence planning processes (NATO Defence Planning Process-NDPP and EUDPP or Capability Development Mechanism-CDM). Therefore, it is essential to explore the aim of NDPP and its impact on the Alliance. The aim of the NDPP, in short, is to define how many (and what kind of) divisions, air wings and ships, (in sum, capabilities that are associated with military and non-military requirements), are necessary to achieve the level of ambition of the Alliance. The NDPP directly affects national defence plans by harmonizing them with NATO's identified security and defence objectives as well by influencing the development of the innovative national defence capabilities.[65]

In the post-Cold War era, the influence of territorial defence on the defence planning efforts of NATO sharply decreased, because crisis response operations with expeditionary characteristics dominated. However,

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[63] Harry Lye, "Europe steps up defence spending: IISS", "Europe as a whole has seen a steady increase in defence spending as economies recover and European members of NATO step up their ambitions to meet the recommended spend of 2% of GDP on defence. Only Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Austria, Montenegro and Luxembourg saw their defence spending decrease in 2019, with every other nation raising its spend.", https://www.army-technology.com/features/europe-steps-up-defence-spending-iiss/ (Retrieved: 02.12.2020)

[64] SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2020, https://www.scribd.com/document/451241107/SIPRI-Trends-in-International-Arms-Transfer-2019 (Retrieved: 02.12.2020)

[65] Paweł Fleischer, "NATO Defence Planning Process, Implications for Defence Posture", 2015, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285543654_NATO_Defence_Planning_Process_Implications_for_defence_posture (Retrieved: 02.12.2020)

the Ukraine Crisis prompted NATO heads of state and government to change course and initiate a process of alliance adaptation. As such, defence planners received a strong impetus to refocus significant efforts on the core task of collective defence.[66] As a result, the emphasis of collective defence in the last two Political Guidance documents (2015 and 2019), the purpose of which is to give direction to defence planning efforts, gradually increased.[67]

The main problem related to NDPP for the EU is that "the strategic autonomy of Europe" is not an objective for the NDPP.[68] With NATO's refocus on collective and territorial defence, again to counter the RF power in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea, NDPP imposes territorial defence requirements on the EU member states. Valasek[69] highlights that NDPP requests, besides the other warfare capabilities, the need for heavy armour, missile defence, anti-submarine warfare, and air command and control systems, which are primary assets for collective and territorial defence. Even in the short time frame after the Ukraine Crisis, the impact of the NDPP on the EU's own defence planning effort can also be seen. The "10 Years of CSDP" report underlines that; *Such ambiguity over capability requirement priorities (between NDPP and CDP) has serious implications not only for the success of CSDP missions but also for the aim of 'strategic autonomy' and the priority it should be accorded.*[70]

Furthermore, assessment of the "The Military Balance 2020"[71] for Europe indicates that the procurement efforts of the EU countries (especially the Baltic states, Germany, and eastern European countries) focus on their

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[66] Alexander Mattealer, Ibid, p. 346.

[67] Rachel Ellehuus, "Political Guidance 2019, approved at the NATO Defense Ministerial in February 2019, was an important step in setting NATO's overall level of ambition. Ideally, it would go one step further by stating that collective defense is the first task among equals and, as such, should be prioritized in terms of resourcing.", 2019, https://breaking defense.com/2019/04/blueprint-for-a-more-effective-nato/ (Retrieved: 02.12.2020)

[68] Sven Biscop, *European Strategy in the 21st Century: New Future for Old Power*, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London, New York, 2019, p. 172-175.

[69] Tomáṭ Valáṭek, "The EU's New Defense Pact: Marginal Gains", *Carnegie Europe*, 16 November 2017, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/74760 (Retrieved: 02.12.2020)

[70] Christoph O. Meyer, "10 Years of CSDP", 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2020/603485/EXPO_IDA(2020)603485_EN.pdf (Retrieved: 02.12.2020)

[71] For detail, see, The Military Balance, Chapter Four: Europe, 2020, 120: 1, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597222.2020.1707964 (Retrieved: 02.12.2020)

own defence, which is compatible with NATO and NDPP's priorities. Consequently, having increased the defence budgets and prioritized collective defence through NDPP, NATO has started to make an impact on the EU's CSDP and transform its characteristics towards territorial defence while struggling to deter and counter the RF. Meanwhile, collective defence requirements are not only limited to territorial defence forces and assets, but are also related to being at proper readiness levels. Therefore, NATO has taken measures besides NDPP to increase the readiness level of the Allies' forces. The most important of these is the NRI, as explained above.

2.5. NATO and the EU Co-operation

The relationship between NATO and the EU did not start with the Ukraine Crisis; in fact, relations were launched with the Berlin Plus Agreement in 2003. At that time, the EU was willing to exploit NATO resources to conduct its missions. However, following the Ukraine Crisis, the relationship seemed to have reversed; NATO declared that there was a need for NATO and EU collaboration to counter the new threats that the Euro-Atlantic area faced. The NATO Warsaw Summit in July 2016 marked the turning point in EU-NATO relations. In a joint declaration, the leaders of both organizations stated that the unprecedented challenges emanating from the South and the East required: "*New ways of working together and a new level of ambition; because our security is interconnected; because together we can mobilize a broad range of tools to respond to the challenges we face, and because we have to make the most efficient use of resources*"[72]

As mentioned above, PESCO and its projects started just after the Ukraine Crisis, although it had been introduced with the Lisbon treaty in 2009. There are currently 47 PESCO projects, which include projects in the areas of capability development and in the operational dimension, distributed in various domains, with almost a quarter of them being dedicated to European collective defence. When scrutinized closely, some of these projects were seen to have strengthened the link with NATO. PESCO's list of

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[72] Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Press Release (2016) 119, 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ official_texts_133163.htm (Retrieved: 02.12.2020)

projects shows that it already serves both the EU and NATO, even though this has not been stated explicitly.[73] Furthermore, military mobility, which is the most important and expensive project in the current PESCO projects, is a specific example showing how NATO drives the defence efforts of the EU. Military mobility was in the new set of common EU-NATO co-operation proposals on the implementation of the joint declaration in 2017. Having lost many of the capabilities, in terms of collective and territorial defence to balance the RF during the post-Cold War era, NATO realized that it does not have the proper ability to move its forces through Europe to protect its new member states located on the eastern flank.[74] This project is so significant that both NATO and EU authorities brought it on to the agenda just after the Ukraine Crisis. The return of NATO's new military strategy back to being collective-defence-centric acknowledges the speed of response required to counter the RF as a one of its priorities; achieved through facilitating the movement of armed forces across the EU, by tackling both procedural obstacles and infrastructure problems.[75] This project is also crucial for the US and its presence in Europe, as such military mobility has been neglected since the end of the Cold War.[76]

As understood, projects such as military mobility strengthen the European pillar of NATO, whereby Europeans can contribute to more collective territorial defence, as NATO and, most importantly, the US demand. Besides all the measures mentioned above, NATO has also introduced new command and force structures to accelerate the decision-making system and its responsiveness. During the Warsaw Summit in 2016, NATO Allies agreed to review the command structure, so that it continues to meet the challenges of a complex and evolving security environment.[77]

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[73] For detail, see, Sven Biscop, European Defence: Give PESCO a Chance Survival, 2018, Vol. 60, No. 3, p. 174, https://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2018/06/ European-defence-give-PESCO-a-change-SvenBiscop-June18-1.pdf, (Retrieved: 02.12.2020)

[74] Teri Schultz, "NATO in Europe needs 'military Schengen' to rival Russian mobility" https://www.dw.com/en/nato-in-europe-needs-military-schengen-to-rival-russian-mobility /a-40470302 (Retrieved: 02.12.2020)

[75] Sven Biscop, Ibid, p. 11.

[76] Clingendael (Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael) Report, Ibid.

[77] NATO Fact Sheet, http://mivagyunkanato.hu/pdf/nato_kiadvanyok_angol/1802-Factsheet-NATO-Command-Structure_en.pdf, (Retrieved: 02.12.2020)

This new command structure increased not only the number of personnel, but also the role of some member states like Germany, which hosts a new support and enablement command. As seen, NATO has refocused on collective and territorial defence to balance RF power. In this way, NATO's policies have affected the EU's CSDP and caused it to diverge from its expeditionary characteristics.

2.6. Fragmentation in Threat and Security Perceptions in the EU

Since the end of World War II, there have been different approaches and ideas on European defence and security among the member states. While France (Europeanist) has always been in favour of independent policies, the United Kingdom and some other countries have been keen to align policies with the US (Atlantic Focus). Just after the EU Global Strategy that emphasized the autonomy of the EU, the dilemma for the EU appeared again: bandwagoning with the US or balancing against it with the EU's own power. Furthermore, the US hesitation to defend Europe led the EU to rethink the autonomous European defence architecture.[78] The Statement "autonomous" was found toxic by the member states that consider NATO and the US to be an integral part of European security. The effectiveness of the RF's challenge led some member states to question whether the Alliance would be able to defend them, should they be the target of attacks similar to those in Ukraine.[79] As a response, Germany (together with Poland and the Baltic States) refocused on responding to the threat from the East.[80]

On the other hand, France (together with Spain, Italy and Greece) is primarily looking to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). These countries challenge their Allies in NATO to develop a strategy for MENA. This different perception causes discontent among the eastern flank of the EU. For instance, Poland feels that not all NATO member states appreciate its situation, as the focus is on Mediterranean member states with Syria and the refugee crisis. Vukadinović argues that NATO must find a way to

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[78] Nick Witney, Building Europeans' Capacity to Defend Themselves, 2019, https://ecfr.eu/publication/building_europeans_capacity_to_defend_themselves/ (Retrieved: 02.12.2020)
[79] The Military Balance, Chapter Four: Europe, 2020, 120: 1, p. 77, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597222.2020.1707964 (Retrieved: 02.12.2020)
[80] Friis Karsten, NATO and Collective Defence in the 21st Century: an Assessment of the Warsaw Summit, Routledge 2017, p. 53-56.

return a sense of security and sense of importance within the Alliance to Poland.[81] Poland, like the Baltic States, is in favour of NATO's collective defence mechanism.

The fragmented perceptions of the threat are also reflected in defence spending in Europe. According to the NATO Report,[82] while eastern and central European states dramatically increased their defence spending including through modernization (especially for collective defence purposes) after the Ukraine Crisis, the southern European countries hardly increased their defence spending at all, although they agree on the RF threat. As a result, this fragmentation may also lead to putting European co-operation and further integration at risk.

In the meantime, as an economically powerful member and the Alliance's most significant European financial contributor, Germany is expected to carry more of the burden. Due to this reason, the US has especially underlined that Germany has to increase its defence spending.[83] Germany has responded positively, and has increased its defence budget steadily, even if it has not reached the 2% of GDP level agreed in the Wales Summit. Some think-tank foundations in Germany also emphasize that a future positive relationship between Germany and the US is essential for Germany and Europe alike. Overall, Germany has increased its effectiveness in the European defence system and sees these new circumstances as a chance to be a player in the transformation of NATO that will ensure the future of the Alliance.

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[81] Lidija Č. Vukadinović, Monika Begović and Luka Juțić, "NATO in Europe: Between Weak European Allies and Strong Influence of Russian Federation", *Croatian International Relations Review*, 2017, Vol. 23, No. 80, p. 14.

[82] Mesterhazy Atilla, "Burden Sharing: New Commitments in a New Era", 2018, https://www.nato-pa.int/view-file?filename=/sites/default/files/2018-12/2018%20-%20 BURDEN%20SHARING%20NEW%20COMMITMENTS%20IN%20A%20NEW%20 ERA%20-%20MESTERHAZY%20REPORT%20-%20170%20DSCTC%2018%20E%20 rev1%20fin.pdf (Retrieved: 02.12.2020)

[83] "Germany 'not fair' on defense spending, says Donald Trump The US president has claimed Germany and other NATO members "owe billions" for falling short of spending targets." https://www.dw.com/en/germany-not-fair-on-defense-spending-says-donald-trump/a-42897851 (Retrieved: 02.12.2020)

Most of the EU member states have conformed to the US demand and increased their defence budgets. Germany and the states in the eastern flank of NATO are more compatible with the US and NATO policies. With the impact of the US, fragmentation in defence policy and threat perceptions within the EU dramatically deepened in the new security environment following the Ukraine Crisis. Eventually, two (new) blocs appeared; the first, under German leadership, focuses on collective and territorial defence under NATO and the US security umbrella. In contrast, the second, under French leadership, advocates the autonomy of Europe and emphasizes the threat stemming from MENA. Due to this situation, the direction of CSDP seems unclear. Yet, in the short term, it might be assessed that the CSDP will likely focus on more imminent European problems and threats instead of the global perspective.

Conclusion

Began in 2014 and continuing today, the Ukraine Crisis has been one of the most critical turning points in the relations between the RF, the EU, NATO and the US, and raised questions on European security architecture since the Cold War. From the neorealist perspective, it was purely a case of the balance of power, actualized by the RF that had struggled for almost two decades after the Cold War to balance the West in its post-Soviet territory. This crisis has not only affected relations, but also changed the threat perception in the EU and most importantly, has made a significant impact on security environment and co-operation between the global actors.

With the research question, determined as: "To what extend has post-Ukraine Crisis security perception affected CSDP transformation?", it has been concluded that the Ukraine Crisis and related major security implications after 2014 have significantly shaped and transformed the CSDP. After the Ukraine Crisis, NATO refocused on collective and territorial defence. The new policies of NATO made a significant impact on the EU. The states that are both members of NATO and the EU had to increase their defence budgets by focusing on the procurement of collective defence assets. In order to fit the readiness requirements, the new member states accelerated their modernization efforts. The EU has also transformed its own defence tools in line with NATO policies. Eventually, after the Ukraine Crisis, with NATO's influence, the CSDP is losing its expeditionary characteristics and gaining more collective defence features.

As the most significant contributor to NATO, the US and its policies have been behind NATO's activities. However, some deep fragmentation between the EU member states might affect this policy, causing divergence of main efforts. Assessing the RF as a real threat, the eastern flank countries and Germany focus on collective defence and tend to be compatible with the US and NATO policies. Yet, the southern Europe countries, under French leadership, are suspicious of collective defence and US policies. Historically, delivering coherent common security and defence policy has always been challenging for the EU since the CSDP has intergovernmental characteristics and all the member states have their own foreign policies.[84] Eventually, this increasing fragmentation between the member states may become an obstacle for European integration.

In summary, with the influence of NATO and US policies, CSDP has started to show more collective defence features, and member states have tended to increase their defence spending, especially on territorial defence assets. Furthermore, fragmentation between member states may change the direction of the CSDP. Eventually, this transformation of the CSDP may cause the EU to lose its global approach, which depends on mobile expeditionary forces. Instead, the EU, with a regional approach that depends on stationary territorial defence, could become just a regional power, which is precisely what the US desires. Therefore, the conclusion of this article is that, with the effect of the RF threat, even if the EUGS suggests a desire for autonomy as a global actor, the EU can't develop an effective and integrated policy and instead will choose to conform to the US' NATO policies in order to balance and deter the RF.

Özet

İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası NATO, Sovyetler Birliğine karşı Avrupa'nın savunmasını üstlenmiştir. Bu sayede Avrupa, savaşın yıktığı kıtanın ekonomik gelişmesini hızlandırma fırsatını yakalamıştır. Soğuk

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[84] Simon Sweeney and Neil Winn, "CSDP and the Open Method of Coordination: Developing the EU's Comprehensive Approach to Security", *Journal of Regional Security*, 2017, 95–121, p. 97.

Savaş'ın ardından güvenlik algılarının değişmesiyle birlikte, entegrasyonunu büyük ölçüde tamamlayan ve küresel bir güç olmayı hedefleyen Avrupa Birliği (AB), dış politikalarında da temel değişikliklere gitmiştir. Bu dönemde AB, güvenlik ve savunma politikalarını hayata geçirmiştir.

Ortak dış ve güvenlik politikalarının ayrılmaz bir parçası olan Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikaları (*Common Security and Defence Policy-*CSDP) Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemin etkilerini içinde barındırmaktadır. AB, kendi sınırlarından ziyade etki ve ilgi alanları içinde sivil güçlerle desteklenen askerî operasyonlar yürütmeyi amaçlamıştır. AB'nin kolektif savunmasını icra edecek olan güvenlik ve savunma politikaları, birliğin büyük ortaklarının (özellikle Fransa) etkisiyle eski sömürge ülkeleri ile AB genişleme politikalarının parçası olan ülkelerin topraklarındaki girişimlere odaklanmıştır. AB, kıta Avrupa'sının alan savunmasını NATO ve ABD'ye bırakırken, güvenlik ve savunma politikaları ile küresel güç olma yolunda adımlar atmıştır. Ancak, küresel güvenlik durumu, 2014 yılında yaşanan Ukrayna Krizi ile temelden sarsılmıştır. Soğuk Savaş'n bitiminden itibaren AB ve NATO'ya karşı cephe kaybettiğini düşünen RF, son kalesi olarak gördüğü Ukrayna'da AB'nin ve NATO'nun "yayılmasını" durdurmuştur.

Bu bağlamda, Ukrayna Krizi sonrası oluşan güvenlik ortamının, CSDP'nin dönüşümüne etkisinin akademik bir kapsamda analiz edilmesi ihtiyacı ortaya çıkmıştır. Çalışmanın araştırma sorusu, "Ukrayna Krizi sonrası güvenlik algısı AB Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikasının dönüşümünü ne ölçüde etkilemiştir?" şeklinde kavramsallaştırılmıştır. AB içinde kolektif savunmanın öneminin artması, askerî harcamalardaki önceki dönemlere kıyasla yaşanan artış ve üye devletler arasında Ukrayna krizi sonrası tehdit ve güvenlik algılarındaki farklılıklar, göstergeler olarak belirlenmiş ve incelenmiştir. Ayrıca NATO ve ABD'nin söz konusu dönem içindeki politikaları ve bu politikaların CSDP üzerindeki etkileri de analiz edilmiştir.

NATO'nun üyelerinin 22'si aynı zamanda AB üyesidir. Bu husus iki organizasyon arasındaki etkileşimi kaçınılmaz kılmaktadır ve bu etkileşim araştırmanın temel dayanaklarından birini oluşturmaktadır. Ukrayna Krizi ile beraber, NATO Avrupa kıtasını RF'ye karşı nasıl savunacağı konusunda politikalara odaklanarak, kolektif savunmanın reflekslerini yeniden kazanma yönünde adımlar atmıştır. NATO ve AB, aynı dönemde mevcut işbirliğini güçlendirirken, CSDP de kaçınılmaz olarak etkilenmiştir. Bu arada

NATO'nun en büyük ortağı olan ve nerdeyse mevcut imkân ve kabiliyetlerinin %50'sini karşılayan ABD'nin Avrupa üzerindeki politika değişimleri de, CSDP'nin dönüşümünü etkileyen diğer bir husus olmuştur.

Sonuç olarak; makalenin ana bulguları iki yönlüdür. Birincisi, CSDP, Avrupa dışı boyuttan bölgesel/toplu savunma özelliklerine doğru evrilmektedir. İkincisi, savunma ve güvenlik politikaları açısından AB'deki ayrışma derinleşmektedir. Çalışmada, AB'nin RF'yi caydırmak maksadıyla, etkin ve bütünleşik bir politika geliştiremeyeceği ve ABD'nin NATO politikaları ile uyumlu hareket edeceği sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.

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